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INTRODUCTION

I.

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 34(c) and 35( c), Appellants Karen White and Elkhorn,
LLC (collectively "White") submit this Reply Brief in rebuttal to the arguments raised by
Respondent Valley County.
wilite incorporates its statement of the course of proceedings and facts in its opening brief
here. TIns matter comes before this Court on a narrow legal issue framed by Judge Lodge in his
Certified Question:
Under Idaho law, when does the statute of limitations begin to run on a cause of
action arising out of an allegedly illegal impact fee imposed by a local
government entity as part of a land use application?
Despite this very straightforward question to tIns Court, Respondent, Valley County (the "County"),
goes to great lengths in its brief to persuade tills Court to ans\ver legal matters beyond the Certified
Question and in one part of their brief the County completely disregards Judge Lodge's Order that
denied one of its questions it sought to be certified and instead abuses this process to elicit an
opinion from this Court with respect to exhausting administrative remedies.
II.

ARGUMENT

A.
Many of the County's Arguments and Issues Raised In The Respondent's Brief Are
Not Properly Before This Court On Certified Question.
The County has presented various arguments outside the scope of the Certified Question
asking this Court to address whether: (1) Judge Lodge "assumed incorrectly that there are two
distinct causes of action" [Respondent's Brief pg. 9] because inverse condemnation and illegal
tax are the same thing; (2) \Vhite's case in untimely for failing to seek a Regulatory Takings
Analysis within 28 days; (3) the statute of limitations period is 28 days; (4) White's case is
untimely for failing to seek judicial review; (5) the exception to exhaustion of administrative
AppeHant's Reply Brief- 1

remedies do not apply in this case; and (6) the County could impose the impact fees independent
of the requirements of IDIF A. None of those issues raised in the County's brief answer or
address the limited issue presented on certified question to this Court and should therefore not be
addressed in this Court's written decision because to do so would result in an advisory opinion.
Courts of the United States may certify a controlling question of law in a pending action
to this Court where there is no controlling precedent and the detennination would materially
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation in the United States court. St. Luke's A1agic Valley
Regional iv1edical Center v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 39-40, 293 P.3d 661,663-664 (20l3); LA.R.

12.3(a). This Court in St. Luke's "~1agic Valley Regional Medical Center (issued January of this
year) reiterated its role in answering a certified question:
When the "question presented is a narrow one," as it is here, "[o]ur role is limited
to answering the certified question." Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc., 113 Idaho
374, 375, 744 P.2d 102, 103 (1987) (cautioning that "to now decide [extraneous
matters] would result in an advisory opinion on a question not certified"). If "the
parties in their briefs and arguments before this Court present [ ] facts outside" the
certification order, we consider "only those facts contained in the order." Kunz v.
Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 902, 792 P.2d 926, 927 n. 1 (1990).
Id.

In this case, Judge Lodge has only asked this Court to detennine "[u]nder Idaho law,
when does the statute of limitations begin to run on a cause of action arising out of an allegedly
illegal impact fee imposed by a local government entity as part of a land use application?"
(underlining added). Judge Lodge did not ask this Court to opine whether he was correct in his
holdings nor does the certified question ask this Court to opine on the merits ofthis case. Judge
Lodge even specifically stated he was not asking this court to answer when the statute of
limitations begins to run on an inverse condemnation claim, "This Court is not asking the Idaho
Supreme Court to address the accrual date for inverse condemnation claims." (See Judge
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Lodge's Certification Order, Dk. 151, p. 11) 1. Judge Lodge specifically held that this certified

question is a narrow legal question before the Idaho Supreme Court. (See Judge Lodge's
Cert~fzcation

Order, Dk. 151, p. 21). Despite Judge Lodge's intent for certifying this limited

question to this Court, the County takes this opportunity to discuss and argue matters outside the
certified question, which is improper.
For example, the County in Section III, of their brief discusses the accrual standard for
inverse condemnation claims to the facts of this case and argues its position as it did on summary
judgment that the statute of limitations for White's inverse condemnation claim ran at the time
the CUP was issued. See Respondent's Briefpg. 26. Judge Lodge however has already decided
that matter on summary judgment. Judge Lodge held that White was not "'fully aware' of the
taking until her project manager on Phase 1, Mr. Findlay, received the final RDA with the
requirement that $166,496 was due for proportional impact fees related to Phase 1." See.
}vfemorandum Order (Docket No. 128, pp. 24-25); CR, pp. 960-961. The County's arguments on

this issue provide no answer to the certified question, but rather attempt to get this Court to
address the merits of the pending case before Judge Lodge. Those matters are outside the scope
of the certified question and should be disregarded by this Court.
In addition, the County also impermissibly attempts to get this Court to opine on legal
questions that Judge Lodge specifically refused to certify to this Court. For example, the County
reframes its failure to exhaust administrative remedies argument that White should have sought
judicial review and having failed to do so, White's cause of action is barred. Judge Lodge's
Order (Docket 152; CR pp. 1095-1102) specifically denied the County request to certify that
question to this Court and yet the County asks this Court to include an analysis of that issue in
1 Judge Lodge's Certification Order, dated August 10, 2012 [Docket No. 151], was not included in the electronic
Clerk's Record, but is part of the pleadings on file with this Court. The Certification Order was filed with this Court
on August 24, 2012.
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this decision. See Respondent's Briefpg. 31. Based on the discussion above, Vvnite respectfully
asks this Court to limit its decision to the certified question presented by Judge Lodge.
B.
The County Has Not Demonstrated \Vhy The Test For Accrual On Inverse
Condemnation Should Apply To Illegal Impact Fees Imposed By A Local Government.

The County argues that the test used for detennining accrual of an inverse condeillilation
claim should be the same test for detennining when the statute of limitations runs when an
impact fee is collected. 2 The County has failed to explain why the 'substantial interference with
plaintiffs property interest, became apparent' standard should apply to cases collecting illegal
impact fees, since there is always a date certain when the impact fees are collected.
This Court has held that the test for detennining when an inverse condeillilation action
accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations "is to be fixed at the point in time at which the
impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs'
property interest, became apparent." Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d
1001,1005 (1979). In making that pronouncement, this Court recognized that the actual date of
a taking, "is not readily susceptible to exact determination ... " Id. Which explains why the test
was created in the first place. Takings claims can arise under various fact patterns and it is not
always clear when the taking may have occurred. For example in Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74,
79,644 P.2d 1333, 1338 (1982) this Court applied the Tibbs standard to an inverse condemnation
claim involving a dairy farm whose land had become flooded by the Idaho Department of Fish
and Game. The Reuth Court recognized that the gradual nature of the taking in that case (i.e. the
rising water) would have been impossible to determine when the taking occurred and therefore

2 The County argues that White's inverse condemnation claim and her illegal tax claim for failing to follow IDIFA
are the same claim and therefore the accrual test for inverse condemnation is the same. As discussed above,
whether a takings claim and a refund claim for collecting an illegal impact fee is the same' cause of action' is
outside the scope of the certified question. White only addresses whether the accrual test applied to takings cases is
appropriate for illegal impact fee cases.
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the Court chose a date when the Department of Fish and Game removed boards from an
irrigation check as the date when the plaintiff recognized the severity of the problem. Id. at
Idaho 79. The Tibbs standard has likewise been used in subsequent takings cases where the date
of taking was not clear. See e.g. l'yfcCuskey v. Canyon County Commissioners, 128 Idaho 213,
912 P.1d 100 (1996) (Tibbs test used to detennine that statute of limitations for takings claim
started at time stop work order was issued); Harris v. State, ex rei. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401,
210 P.3d 86 (2009) (Tibbs test used to detennine that statute of limitations for takings claim
started at time plaintiff signed agreement promising to pay royalties and rents on minerals).
In this case, the collection of money to pay an illegal impact fee does not suffer from the
detennination challenges that a takings claim may have. There is a specific discernible date that
impact fees are collected from the fee payer from which the start of the statute of limitations can
be detennined. Once the money leaves the hands of the fee payer, she now has a cause of action
to seek a refund within the four year statute of limitations set forth in

I.e.

§ 5-224. As such,

there is no need to adopt a 'made aware' standard as that first adopted in Tibbs to detennine
when the statute of limitations begins on an illegal impact fee.
C. This Court Should Adopt The Majority View Holding That A Cause Of Action For An
Illegal Impact Fee Accrues At The Time The Impact Fee Is Paid.

Adopting an accrual date of when the money was collected on a cause of action for a
collection of an illegal impact fee provides certainty and accomplishes all of the purposes of a
statute of limitations. The County in analyzing the out-of-state cases cited by White attempts to
find distinctions or differences which, according to the County make those cases inapplicable to
the answering the certified question. The County's analysis is wrong.
The County first attempts to distinguish the decisions in Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County

of DuPage, 746 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. 2001), Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of La
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Habra, 23 P.3d 601 (Cal. 2001), Paul v. City of Woonsocket, 745 A.2d 169 (R.!. 2000) by

arguing that those holdings are distinguishable because the impact fees charged in those cases
were either done pursuant to an ordinance or were not done pursuant to a land use approval as
was done in Wllite's case. This is a distinction without legal significance. How the illegal
impact fee or illegal tax was charged has no bearing on when the statute of limitations begins to
run. Here, the certified question asks this Court to assume that there is an "allegedly illegal
impact fee" and then asks when does the statute of limitations begin to run? The Sundance and
Howard Jarvis decision both answer the question that the limitations period runs at the time the

fee is collected. As discussed in Appellant's Brief these holding are the majority view and \Vhite
respectfully asks this Court to adopt a similar holding.
The County likewise attempts to discredit the holding in Lowenberg v. Dallas, 168
S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2005) (illegal fire registration fee accrued at time fee was collected) by
arguing that Wl1ite's case is distinguishable because \\'hite's case involved a quid pro quo that
Wllite pay impact fees in exchange for approval. The County once again impennissibly attempts
to focus this Court on the issue of whether the conditioning of approval on the payment of an
impact fee was valid or not. That question however is not before this Court. The Lowenburg
decision is additional persuasive authority for this Court to adopt the majority view that the
statute of limitations runs at the time the illegal impact fee is collected.
CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, Wllite respectfully requests that this Court provide the
answer to the certified question as: the statute of limitations begins to run on a cause of action
arising out of an allegedly illegal impact fee imposed by a local government entity as part of a
land use application at the time the illegal impact fee is paid.
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DATED this 9th day of September, 2013.

Borton Lakey Law Offices

-

BYY~(~
Victor Villegas,
the Frrm
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of September, 2013, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document \vas served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person
in charge of the office as indicated below:

Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendrickson
GIVENS Pl.JRSLEY LLP

P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300

]
]
[ ]
[X]

Victor Villegas
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U.S. Mail
Fax
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery

